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STATE FOR S/SRAP STAFF

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SUBJECT: NAJIBULLAH MOJADDEDI ON REINTEGRATION AND RECONCILIATION

¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: In two recent meetings with Embassy officials, Special Advisor to the President on Health and Education Dr. Najibullah Mojaddedi:

-- singled out insurgents who felt wronged by GIRoA and the international community as those most predisposed to reintegrate;
-- assessed that former insurgents will require land and initial funding to start a new licit life;
-- said he had no knowledge of any reintegration efforts being undertaken by GIRoA Vice Chair of the Demobilization and Reintegration Commission Masoom Stanekzai; and
-- decried the lack of international support for the Program Tahkim-e-Sulh (PTS) he administers on behalf of his Father, Professor Sibghatullah Mojaddedi. END SUMMARY

INSURGENT GROUPS

2.(SBU) In an October 20 meeting on reintegration with Pol-Mil officers and visiting INR analyst, and an October 23 meeting with the Ambassador, Special Advisor to the President on Health and Education Dr. Mojaddedi: (son of the Speaker of the Upper House of Parliament and Chairman of the National Independent Peace and Reconciliation Commission (PTS) Professor Sibghatullah Mojaddedi), divided the insurgency into three groups: those who are affiliated with al Qaeda; those who report to Pakistan's military intelligence; and those who are upset because they feel they have been wronged by international forces, GIRoA or other Afghan factions. This last group, he claimed, is most predisposed to reintegration efforts.

PROGRAM TAHKIM SULH (PTS)

¶13. (C) Dr. Mojaddedi claimed that PTS had successfully reintegrated 9,000 insurgents using only two million dollars in resources, but complained that it no longer receives international financial support (Dr. Mojaddedi did not say what livelihoods these 9,000 former insurgents pursued post-reintegration). When asked whether PTS verifies that reintegrated insurgents continue to eschew the insurgency, Dr. Mojaddedi insisted that PTS maintains excellent oversight of those who have reintegrated and verifies that they remain separated from the insurgency. (NOTE: GIRoA established PTS in May 2005 and, according to its website (www.pts.af), has 12 regional offices, with a headquarters office in Kabul at the Mojaddedi family residence. The U.S. stopped funding PTS in 2008 when PTS failed to track reintegrees and verify their continued commitment to reintegration. Further, the U.S. was unable to verify the numbers of reintegrees; and the preponderance of Mojaddedi family members on the PTS payroll also caused concern. END NOTE.)

¶14. (SBU) Dr. Mojaddedi relayed that insurgents who reintegrate require money to purchase or build a home and start a new life. He said he advised President Karzai to provide ten percent of GIRoA-held land to insurgents who have reintegrated so that they can build homes and establish economic livelihoods; remaining government land should be given to Afghans who had never been part of the insurgency. Dr. Mojaddedi argued that such a system would not create a "perverse incentive" since only a small fraction of Afghanistan's land would be available to former insurgents. He called upon the U.S. and the international community to resume funding of PTS, describing it as a critical mechanism for promoting stability.

ROLE OF OTHER AFGHAN AND GIROA ENTITIES

¶15. (SBU) When asked what part other GIRoA entities can or should play in reintegration, Dr. Mojaddedi said that human rights organizations have a role; he himself had recently met with a group of human rights activists. Further, he said, reintegration efforts should be conducted with support from, and in coordination with, governors and the Afghan National Security Forces.

¶16. (C) On the margins of an October 23 meeting with Ambassador Eikenberry and Dr. Mojaddedi's father, Dr.

Mojaddedi again raised his concern that PTS is being marginalized. He said he was not aware of any plans or programs being developed by Vice Chair of the Demobilization and Reintegration Commission Masoom Stanekzai. Mojaddedi asserted that he is still President Karzai's lead on the issue, due in large part to what he characterized as the influence and trust Mojaddedi's father enjoys among Taliban fighters. Dr. Mojaddedi asked for the U.S. to fund a PTS program to provide expanded vocational training for ex-insurgents and suggested that reintegrated fighters be given six months-one year of financial support so that they can prepare to pursue licit livelihoods.

PREDICTIONS ON THE NEXT ADMINISTRATION'S REINTEGRATION AGENDA

¶17. (SBU) Dr. Mojaddedi said that he knows the exact reintegration agenda President Karzai plans to adopt since he, Mojaddedi, is the President's reconciliation and reintegration advisor, and also attends weekly Cabinet meetings. Dr. Mojaddedi said that President Karzai should and will set a reintegration agenda that calls for GIRoA, the international community and Afghans to: 1) pursue reintegration efforts; 2) fund reintegration efforts; and 3) ensure reintegration efforts have wide support from GIRoA

entities, particularly from governors and the Afghan National Security Forces.

SAUDI TALKS

¶8. (C) Dr. Mojaddedi said that Taliban who had reintegrated through the PTS process had participated in Saudi-led and initiated reconciliation talks that began in December 2007. He said that Taliban affiliated with the Pakistani military's Inter-Services Intelligence agency had not participated in the talks, and without their participation the talks could not be successful.

COMMENT

¶9. (C) Given his family's influential place in Afghan society and his father's close personal ties to President Karzai, we expect Dr. Mojaddedi will continue to play some role in the new GIRoA administration's reintegration efforts.

We are engaging beyond the traditional reintegration players (Minister Stanekzai, Minister of Defense Wardak and Minister of Interior Atmar) to human rights organizations, parliamentarians and non-Pashtuns to elicit their ideas and perspectives, and feed that information) and contacts -- into GIRoA's post-election reintegration deliberations. We are in daily contact with ISAF's Force Reintegration Cell and allied embassies to ensure unity of effort as we seek to support GIRoA reintegration efforts. END COMMENT

EIKENBERRY